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McKee, Circuit Judge. 
In this consolidated immigration appeal, Franklin and Edwin Lopez-Santos, 
brothers and natives of Honduras, petition for review of the BIA’s denial of their 
applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”).  The Government has conceded that the BIA improperly applied Myrie v. 
Attorney General1 as to Franklin’s CAT claim and asks for that claim to be remanded for 
review under the proper standard.2  We agree and will remand for the BIA to reconsider 
Franklin’s CAT claim under a de novo standard of review instead of the clear error 
standard used.  As to Franklin’s withholding from removal claim and Edwin’s 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 855 F.3d 509, 515-16 (3d Cir. 2017). 
2 Appellee Br. at 36 n. 8; accord Appellants’ Op. Br. at 47-48. 
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withholding and CAT claims, we will affirm and must dismiss Franklin’s petition for 
review in part, and Edwin’s in total.3 
I.  
Where, as here, the BIA adopted the reasoning of the IJ in its decision, we review 
the factual determinations in both decisions for substantial evidence.4  We reverse only if 
a reasonable factfinder would be “compelled to conclude otherwise.”5  We review de 
novo any legal conclusions.6   
Edwin claims that the BIA erred in determining he was not entitled to withholding 
of relief.7  He argues the BIA reached this incorrect conclusion by relying on the IJ’s 
incomplete review of the record, excluding certain corroborating affidavits from family 
members, thereby improperly determining that the Honduran government would be able 
to protect him despite evidence of his cousin’s brutal torture and murder.  Though we 
acknowledge the tragic events surrounding his cousin’s death, Edwin gives insufficient 
weight to the adverse credibility determination reached by the IJ and affirmed in the 
BIA’s thorough opinion.8  But setting that determination aside, as the IJ and BIA did in 
 
3 The BIA had appellate jurisdiction of the IJ’s decisions under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  
We have jurisdiction over the BIA’s order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
4 Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003) (“In order to obtain mandatory 
withholding of deportation under § 243(h), the alien must first establish by a ‘clear 





their analyses, Edwin’s case is severely undermined by (1) his statement to Border Patrol 
upon entering the United States that he was coming here to “get ahead in life” and (2) his 
family’s continued residence in Honduras since he left.9  Edwin simply has not 
demonstrated that it is “more likely than not” that he will be subjected to persecution if 
returned to Honduras10 due to the Honduran government’s alleged acquiescence to MS-
13’s violence.11  In a point-by-point review of Edwin’s evidence, the BIA determined the 
IJ’s unchallenged factual findings were not clearly erroneous while bearing in mind the 
country conditions reports submitted by the Petitioners.12  We find the BIA’s review is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
As to Edwin’s CAT claim,13 the BIA’s opinion evidences a substantially similar 
thorough review of the record before affirming the IJ’s factual findings regarding no past 
torture or government acquiescence.14  There is substantial record evidence supporting 
the BIA’s factual findings and no legal error with the BIA’s ultimate conclusion that 
Edwin failed to demonstrate an entitlement to relief under CAT.   
 
9 Franklin A.R. at 235. 
10 See Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 469. 
11 JA10-14. 
12 Id. 
13 Myrie, 855 F.3d at 515 (deferring removal is mandatory where a noncitizen produces 
sufficient evidence establishing he suffered “(1) an act causing severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for an illicit or proscribed purpose; (4) by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has 
custody or control of the victim; and (5) not arising from lawful sanctions”) (quoting 
Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005)).  
14 Id. at 515-16. 
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Thus, as to Edwin’s withholding-of-removal and CAT claims, we hold that he 
failed to demonstrate an entitlement to either by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Finally, as to Franklin’s remaining claim for withholding of removal, he argues 
that the BIA erred in denying him relief due to a misplaced reliance on Matter of A-B-15 
when considering what constitutes government acquiescence.16  Franklin’s primary 
argument is that Matter of A-B- is no longer good law after the injunction issued in Grace 
v. Whitaker,17 where the District Court of the District of Columbia held that the case 
evidences the Attorney General’s inaccurate interpretation of the Administrative 
Procedures Act and Immigration and Nationality Act under Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council.18  We need not address that claim here to affirm the BIA’s 
order.  Whether we apply the “unable or unwilling to control,” “condoned,” or “complete 
helplessness” standards for government acquiescence, substantial evidence supports the 
unchallenged findings relied upon by the BIA when determining that the evidence 






15 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
16 Appellees’ Br. at 45, 56. 
17 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 105 (D.D.C. 2018). 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Franklin’s petition for review as to his 
withholding claim and grant his petition as to his CAT claim while remanding for further 
review in accordance with this Opinion.  We will dismiss Edwin’s petition for review in 
total.19 
 
19 The Respondent’s motion to waive filing paper copies of the transcript is granted. 
